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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
PALESTINIAN CLAIMS AND THE ARAB STATES
J. L. Taulbee*
DavidP. Forsythe**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last few years there has been a revival of interest in
international law as a mechanism for conflict resolution. These same
years have seen a demonstration of the undeveloped state of
international law, particularly concerning intrastate conflicts. The
wide disagreement about questions of fact, legal consequence, and
world order implications of internal war is a telling commentary on
the current problems of applying legal standards to such conflicts. A
major part of the disagreement can be explained in terms of the
specific problems relating to fact determination and authoritative
interpretation engendered by the nature of the environment in which
the international legal order must function. The ambiguous and
emotionally charged atmosphere that is characteristic of all international actions when force or the threat of force is involved also
contributes to the disagreement.
Conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli dispute clearly raise the question
whether the traditional approaches and concepts of international law
are adequate to characterize the range and variety of contemporary
internal disorders and the types of involvement by third states. In
addition, many international legal norms are not specific enough in
content to allow "illegal" behavior to be identified with confidence.
This is true especially of norms purporting to limit the use of
coercion. Under the general heading of "minor coercion," the many
different forms of coercive influence have remained largely undifferentiated in law. The major problem is not the perennial one of making
appropriate judgments about state behavior, but the more complex
problem of constructing categories that will accurately reflect the
changed and changing milieu in which the law must function.
This is a challenging and perhaps insuperable task. The most
fundamental obstacle to clarification remains the decentralized nature
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of the international legal order, which permits national decisionmakers to reach authoritative determinations of fact and legal
consequence by their own "adversary" representations.' Even when
there is a consensus in support of desired behavior, there is neither
uniformity of legal technique, nor an established framework with
substantial agreement on usage, to encourage a convergence of views.
Often a single label is used to refer to several different phenomena,
but a similarity in labels does not imply necessarily a similarity in
factual points or legal reference. 2
Yet, there remains a need for third party inquiry into both the
relevance of international law to conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli
confrontation and, in particular, the status of Palestinian claims to use
violence to change the present status quo. With due regard for the
limitations of legal techniques and third party observations, 3 it bears
emphasizing that law can provide both a technical language for
rational discussion of emotion-filled issues4 and a framework of

1. For a discussion of the difference between adversary arguments and
transcendental legal judgments see R.
WORLD

FALK, LEGAL ORDER IN A VIOLENT

334-35 (1968); for a different view see McDougal, Some Basic

Theoretical Concepts about InternationalLaw: A Policy Oriented Frameworkof
Inquiry, 4 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 337 (1960).

2. For example, does the term "intervention" denote delictual conduct, or is
it a neutral term; does it denote a fact or a supposed legal judgment? Perhaps a
prior question is what are the legally permissible forms of involvement by states in
the internal affairs of other states? Some observers think of intervention in terms
of standards to which behavior ought to conform; others see it as a certain set of
consequences stemming from behavior; still others see it as certain forms of
behavior; and many equate it with certain intentions underlying behavior.
Consequently, we have discussions of military, diplomatic, ideological and
economic intervention. The concept has been defined in such a general way that
even inaction whenever certain consequences follow can be regarded as
intervention. Logically this can produce such absurd conclusions as the inference
that both the inaction of the United States in Indochina in 1954 and our heavy
involvement there a decade later constitute intervention. See generally Rosenau,
Intervention as a Scientific Concept, 13 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 153
(1969).
3. For example, see the debate between Rostow and Wright. Rostow, Legal
Aspects of the Search for Peace in the Middle East, and Wright, The Middle
Eastern Crisis, in Proceedings, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 64-70, 71-77 (1970).

4. For a discussion of law as a language and tool of moderation see Coplin,
International Law and Assumptions about the State System, 17 WORLD

POLITICS 615 (1965). It should be noted that "communication" -does not imply
either understanding or acceptance of claims. The use of a common framework is
no guarantee against misperception, and the nature of the communication may
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analysis that may lead to an understanding of what is a reasonable
solution in the context of the conflict.'
A. Analytical Perspectives
In order to be effective, the law requires some minimal consensus
among those whose behavior is to be regulated on acceptable means
and ends, which may be expressed either in a positive sense as
community or in a negative sense as deterrence. If mutuality of
interests, positive or negative, is absent, law becomes little more than a
rhetorical device or ideological tool to be manipulated at will, rather
than a relevant consideration in the policy-making process. This often
seems the case when statesmen invoke universal or general principles
in support of their politics. These principles may express community
interests, but they are cast at a level of abstraction that renders the
principle irrelevant as a guide in specific situations. Any consensus on
principle must be at a level that is meaningful to a particular conflict.
Nevertheless, both in analysis and in rhetoric, it is customary to
refer to the international system and the international legal order as if
there were only one system and one legal order. The use of the system
concept is understandable. As a simplifying assumption and organizational construct, the idea of an international system is attractive. To a
certain extent it does correspond with reality, and in thought and
predetermine the response. The communication may convey a threat to basic
values. In addition, there must be some correspondence between reality and
language. If reality and language are totally divergent, i.e. if the legal principles
invoked are inappropriate to the facts as known, then law is destroyed as a
language that parties hold in common. For example, note the Soviet position on
Czechoslovakia. 23 U.N. SCOR, 1441st meeting 8-9, 26 (1968), U.N. Doc. S/PV.
1441.
5. Myres McDougal argues that there are opposing normative sets applicable
to every situation. In context, however, not all normative sets are equally
convincing. So far as disputes are concerned, it is a commonplace observation that
international law is used as a means of bolstering political claims. In this view law
is merely one more weapon in the armory of national rhetoric. Appeal to legal
considerations is one way of mobilizing international support. The Israelis, for
example, have attempted to rationalize normally illegal actions, such as their
activities in East Jerusalem, in legal terms. This is a very cynical and narrow view
of the function of law. Because policy makers do feel compelled to give some
attention to legal justification, law must be perceived to be more than a simple
exercise in rhetoric, more than a systematic ex post facto rationalization.
McDougal, supra note 1, at 347. See also L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE
3-30 (1968); Taulbee, Reprisals and State Responsibilityfor the Acts of Guerrillas
and Other IrregularForces, AM. Soc'y INT'L L. (1971) (mimeo).
Vol. 6-No. 1
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discourse it is much easier to deal with one system than with multiple
systems.
The major problem in dealing with international law and politics
from a comprehensive systemic viewpoint is remoteness from
specific political realities. From a systemic perspective, the constituents of system order are often defined in terms of major actor
interests. Thus the basic threats to international order are commonly
characterized as nuclear war and imperial expansion. International
order is identified with policies that purport to limit expansion and
minimize the risk of nuclear war. Description becomes confused with
prescription. These policies become norms for all actors in the system.
In situations in which nonmajor actors are involved, this assumption
about the requisites for order can lead to significant distortions in
perspective.
Given the complexity and diversity of the contemporary international milieu, the possibility of more than one system and more
than one legal order would seem a permissible assumption. The
numerous ideological struggles, the bi-polarity of military power, and
the various and conflicting forms of tacit and formal recognition
suggest that assumptions of singularity might be misplaced. 6 Also,
with some exceptions such as functional organizations, decisions
about the rightful exercise of authority in the international system are
made in regional and local subsystems. 7
6. McDougal and his associates have suggested the possibility of multiple legal
orders operating concurrently within the contemporary international system. In
application McDougal assumes that there are two legal orders-a Western one
based upon human dignity and a totalitarian one based upon the denial of human
dignity. In essence, McDougal retains a somewhat disguised system focus. Norms
(policies) that promote "human dignity" are given universal significance. Even
though McDougal emphasizes the importance of political context in evaluating
specific claims, he still defines the requisites for stability and order in terms of
systemic (and status quo) considerations. McDougal & Lasswell, The
Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L
L. 1 (1959). See generally M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND
MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961). Adda Bozeman has also questioned
the existence of a unitary international system. The major defect in Bozeman's
approach is the assumption that the functions of municipal and international law
are determined directly by the same factors. See A. BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE
OF LAW IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD (1971).
7. Frey-Wouters, The Prospects for Regionalism in World Affairs, in 1 THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 463 (C. Black & R. Falk

eds. 1969); Miller, The Prospectsfor Order Through Regional Security, in 1 THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

556 (C. Black & R. Falk

eds. 1969).
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This is not to reject the possibility that some universal norms do
exist, but rather to point out that the interface between system and
specific subsystems has received little attention. Ultimately, we are
concerned with "fit"; that is, the degree of congruence between norms
for behavior and patterns of behavior. This inquiry is a tentative
attempt to assess the validity of certain universal norms for action in
the Middle Eastern subsystem and to isolate the factors that may
indicate the evolution of a normative set distinctive to this region.
B.

The Political-LegalDistinction

One further series of comments is in order by way of introduction.
Many scholars insist upon distinguishing political from legal considerations, and argue that "politics" rather than law will determine the
future of Middle Eastern conflicts. The authors of this article contend
that this is not a viable distinction: there are no inherently "political"
disputes. The task of legal analysis is to conjoin law and politics
without collapsing one into the other.'
The insistence on this distinction rests on a misunderstanding of
the relationship between law and conflict. In general, there is no
antipathy between law and conflict over public policy; that is,
normally one should not speak of a breakdown of law when conflict
occurs. In a decentralized legal system there may be some question
about how conflict should be interpreted-whether it should be
considered as deviant or creative, as precedent shattering or precedent
creating-but this does not indicate the irrelevance of law. Rather, it
indicates that conflict often produces new legal norms by making
explicit the issues involved in a particular context.
Furthermore, the view that separates law from politics concentrates too much on the restraint function of law. While law does
function as a restraint system in pursuit of order, it also functions to
promote and protect other public policy goals subsumed under the
general heading of "equity." In this sense law constitutes the formal
aspect of a particular conflict relationship and expresses the more
lasting interests of the parties involved. This is only to indicate that in
most conflict situations the parties have shared, as well as disputed,
interests. Law may be characterized as a mediating structure-a
mechanism that provides a common framework, a common point of

8. Falk, The Relevance of PoliticalContext to the Nature and Functioningof
International Law: An Intermediate View, in THE RELEVANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 133, 141 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffmann eds. 1968).
Vol. 6-No. 1
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reference for the control of cognitive divergence. 9 It is with these
functions of law in mind that we make a tentative overview of the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
II. LEGAL STATUS OF THE PALESTINIANS
The central issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict is the status of the
Palestinians. The question has at least two dimensions: territorial
control and personal identity. The former may be amenable to
rational settlement, the latter may not. Most fundamentally, the
Arab-Israeli conflict reflects a mutual denial of national and personal
identity. 10 An increasingly prominent factor in the situation since
1967 has been the use of violence by various Palestinian organizations. Through various activities the fedayeen " have attempted to
coerce not only Israel but also certain Arab states. Consequently, it is
clear that regional stability depends on an equitable settlement of
Palestinian claims. A regional, minimal consensus on a "just"
resolution of outstanding claims is required, and it is toward an
evaluation of such demands that international law becomes centrally
relevant.
Nothing is to be gained from reciting the history of the struggle
for Palestine. 1 Both Zionists and Arabs have numerous grievances,
and all have been subject to considerable extra-regional manipulation.
The initial problem in evaluating these grievances is characterization of
the situation. For the purposes of this inquiry, there is reason to
characterize the core Israeli-Palestinian struggle as a civil war for
control of smaller Palestine. 13
9. Glenn, Johnson, Kimmel & Wedge, A Cognitive Interaction Model to
Analyze Culture Conflict in InternationalRelations, 14 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 35, 37 (1970).
10. Glenn, Johnson, Kimmel & Wedge, supra note 9, at 40; Peretz, Arab
Palestine: Phoenix or Phantom?, 48 FOR. AFFAIRS 322 (1970); Harkabi, The
Position of the Palestinians in the Israeli-Arab Conflict and Their National
Covenant, 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 209 (1970).
11. Fedayeen is used as a synonym for "guerrilla." Of the approximately
3,000,000 individuals who identify themselves as Palestinians, perhaps 50,000 are
active in various armed organizations and would be classified as fedayeen in the
most precise sense. Fedayeen is preferred to more subjective alternatives available
such as terrorists, freedom fighters, resistance fighters, etc.
12. See, e.g., J. HUREWITZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINE (1950); F.
KHOURI, THE ARAB-ISRAELI DILEMMA (1969); W. LAQUEUR, THE
ARAB-ISRAELI READER (1968); N. SAFRAN, FROM WAR TO WAR (1969).
13. The following points should be made about this language: (a) Smaller
Palestine refers to western Palestine, or that part of Greater Palestine remaining
Fall, 1972
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Arab claims regarding the nonlegislative nature of the partisan
United Nations resolution,' 4 which purported to divide Palestine
between Zionists and Arabs, have merit. I Considerable evidence
exists to support the Arab contention that the terms of the original
Mandate, the Balfour Declaration, and Article 80 of the Charter
guaranteed Palestinian rights in the territory. 16 Additionally, the
Arabs can point to continued and effective local control for over a
thousand years. 17 Therefore, if the Assembly resolution is not legally
binding, and if the United Kingdom were unable, as it claimed, to
protect the rights of the indigenous population in the territory, then
the conflict may be regarded most accurately as a civil war within the
territory of Palestine.
The traditional law prohibiting third party involvement in civil
wars has been violated extensively in the 20th century. 18 Thus
arguments regarding the legitimacy of the Arab states' support of
Palestinian claims in 1948 cannot be authoritatively resolved. While
such legal considerations may have been relevant in the past, the
results of the 1948 war for Palestine must be given some legitimacy by

after the United Kingdom granted independence to Trans-Jordan in 1946; (b) in
referring to Palestinians as Arabs, the authors are aware that a number of Jews are
also indigenous to Palestine, but these have now become Israelis. The word
Palestinian is now a useful way to refer to Arabs who live in the area, even though
there remains some necessary overlap between Palestinians and Arab Israelis.
14. G. A. Res. 147 (1947).
15. R. FALK, THE STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

174

(1970); 0.

DECLARATIONS

ASAMOAH.
THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF THE UNITED

NATIONS 11 (1966); Lande, The Effect of Resolutions of the United Nations
GeneralAssembly, 19 WORLD POLITICS 83 (1966); Onuf, ProfessorFalk on the
Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 64 AM. J. INT'L L.
349 (1970).
16. See Elaraby, Some Legal Implications of the 1947 Partition Resolution
and the 1949 Armistice Agreements, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 97, 103-104
(1968); Wright, The Middle East Problem, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 271 (1970);
Bousky, The Claims of the Arabs and Jews to Palestine, 45 PAPERS OF THE
MICHIGAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 265 (1960).
17. Wright, Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situation, in THE MIDDLE
EAST: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE 11 (I. Shapiro ed. 1969), and in 33 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 97 (1968); AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE,
SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 5 (1970).
18. I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 322 (1963); Farer, Intervention in Civil Wars: A Modest Proposal,in 1
THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 509, 515 (R. Falk ed.
1968).
Vol. 6-No. 1
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any legal system seeking to maintain order. Israel, now the incumbent
regime in a protracted civil war, has acquired legitimacy in the
following ways: Arab acceptance of the post-1948 partition resolution; the admission of the state of Israel to the United Nations; general
acceptance of Israel by many states in bilateral recognition; and
effective exercise of state functions. The Palestinians, once the
potential incumbent regime, are now most accurately regarded as the
challenging faction in the continuing struggle.
What, then, is the legal relationship of the Arab states to the state
of Israel? The Arab states have interpreted the four Armistice
Agreements of 1949 as a temporary military cease-fire pending
settlement of the state of belligerency in a formal peace treaty.
Accordingly, the state of belligerency is said still to exist. The status
of an armistice seems to be a question not fully resolved in
international law. The traditional interpretation favors the Arab view
while more recent developments tend to undermine it. In 1951 the
Security Council held that, under Article 40, no claim of belligerency
was permitted during an armistice that envisaged progress to peace,
and expressly prohibited a return to hostilities. 19 United Nations
practice apparently has established the position that if U.N. machinery
is in operation, an armistice under its auspices establishes a legal
situation in which the provisions of the Charter will be applied,
thereby prohibiting a claim to belligerency. 0 The rights and duties of
19. Higgins, The Place of InternationalLaw in the Settlement of Disputes by
the Security Council, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1970). In the 1949 Agreements all
parties affirmed the principle that no aggressive action by either's armed forces
would be undertaken, planned or threatened against the people or armed forces of
the other. It was agreed that no military or paramilitary force of either party
would commit any hostile .act against the forces of the other or otherwise violate
the international frontier or the sea or air space of the other party. The agreement
also delineated the Armistice Demarcation Line, but stated that it was not to be
considered in any sense as a political or territorial boundary. Nonmilitary claims
were specifically left open for later agreement: "It is emphasized that it is not the
purpose of the Agreement to establish, to recognize, to strengthen, or to weaken
or nullify in any way, any territorial, custodial or other rights, claims or interests
which may be asserted by either party in the area of Palestine or any part or
locality thereof covered by this Agreement, whether such asserted rights, claims,
or interests derive from the Security Council resolutions.., or from any other
sources. The provisions of this Agreement are dictated exclusively by military
considerations and are valid only for the period of the Armistice." 4 U.N. SCOR,
Spec. Supp. 3, at 3, U.N. Doe. S/1264/Rev. 1 (1949). There are similar provisions
in all the other armistice agreements.
20. R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 214
(1967).
Fall, 1972

PALESTINIAN CLAIMS AND THE ARAB STATES

third-party states to a civil war, as noted above, are too controversial
to permit a judgment supported by consensus. 21 Therefore, we turn
to other criteria in order to evaluate the Arab states' relations with the
Palestinians.
Two basic problems are of central importance: first, the validity of
Palestinian claims vis-h-vis Israel, and permissible actions concerning
enforcement of these claims; and secondly, the legal relationship of
the Arab states to the Palestinians. Considerable polemical literature
exists concerning "wars of national liberation" and the justness of the
"anti-imperial struggle," but there are few nonpolemical works on the
status of these movements. We turn now to this additional area of
complexity.
III.

PALESTINIAN CLAIMS

There can be no challenge to the historical fact that Arabs
constituted an overwhelming majority of persons and property owners
in pre-1947 Palestine. ' While there is some challenge and controversy
over responsibility for the exodus of Palestinian Arabs from their
homes during 1947-1948, objective third-party inquiry cannot overlook either the examples of concerted Zionist efforts to harass Arabs
or the lack of empirical evidence to support Zionist arguments that
Arab leaders encouraged flight. I
From these facts stem two types of Palestinian claims-a collective
claim to national self-determination, which was endorsed recently by
the General Assembly, and an individual claim to a choice between
repatriation or resettlement with compensation, which has been
acknowledged yearly by the Assembly since 1948. These two types of
claims, in one form, can be said to constitute one general claim. If
repatriation of some 1.5 million Palestinians were to occur at once,
the probability is that Israel as a Zionist state would cease to exist
shortly thereafter, either through violence or through such peaceful
means as a higher Arab birth rate. I Thus, when the possibility of
21. For an overview of problems raised by civil war situations, see Forsythe,
UN Peacekeepingand Domestic Instability, 15 ORBIS 1064 (1972).
22. See, e.g., N. SAFRAN, supra note 12, at 23-26; cf. Peretz, Problems of
Arab Refugee Compensation, 8 MIDDLE EAST J. 403 (1954).
23. For an objective presentation of Zionist harassment see Stevens, Arab
Refugees: 1948-1952, 6 MIDDLE EAST J. 281 (1952). See generally J. DAVIS,
THE EVASIVE PEACE, 53-60 (1968); N. SAFRAN, supra note 12, at 35.
24. Controversy over the original number of refugees does not affect this
point, whether that number be 700,000 or 750,000 or some other number. See
Forsythe, UNRWA, The Palestine Refugees, and World Politics 1949-1969,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
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large scale repatriation is left unqualified, the two claims can be
viewed as complementary.
The claim to national self-determination presents rather obvious
difficulties when asserted as a legal principle, despite repeated
endorsements of the concept in the Assembly during the last decade.
Historically, the status of this concept in international law has been
murky. I Moreover, it is obvious that the states asserting the principle
as law restrict its application decidedly. I Of course, black peoples are
said to have the right to self-determination vis-a-vis white regimes; but
what about Kurdish people in Iraq, Armenians in Lebanon, Georgians
in the U.S.S.R., and Navajos in the United States? In short, there is no
general application of the principle. Despite this rather major
restriction on the development of national self-determination as a part
of customary law, it seems relevant to note that non-Western and
socialist states assert quite strongly a claim that struggles for national
liberation are "just" under the "higher" law of anti-imperialism.
The claim to choice between repatriation or resettlement for
individuals is at once more complex and more simple. Freedom of
choice in matters of repatriation has little standing in international
law, except that there is agreement in opposition to forced repatriation-whether to the U.S.S.R. in the 1940's or to North Korea in the
1950's. Moreover, the Palestinians have never claimed to be "stateless
persons" in the legal sense of that term. It is clear, however, that
repatriation or resettlement is a community-desired choice for the
Palestinians, as evidenced by yearly endorsements of paragraph eleven
of A/Res/194 (III) in each Assembly plus numerous efforts to
implement the principle over the past two decades via United Nations
and United States efforts. The state of Israel is virtually a minority of
one in opposition to recognition of the validity of the principle.
Part of the difficulty lies in the ambiguity surrounding Arab
pronouncements concerning a "just solution to the refugee question."
If the state of Israel be regarded as legitimate, as argued here and as
supported by general state practice, then unqualified repatriation as a
weapon against Israeli security cannot be permitted. Moreover, there is
little reason to believe that unqualified repatriation could lead to a
democratic, secular, binational state of Palestine; rather, there is every

25. See generally W.TUNG,

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN ORGANIZING

(1968). The inclusion of the right to self-determination in two covenants
accepted by the General Assembly in the late 1960's is counterbalanced by lack of
definitions, sanctions and ratifications.
26. For a discussion of problems in applying the higher law of self-determination see Emerson, The New Higher Law of Anti-Colonialism, in THE
RCELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 8, at 153.
WORLD
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reason to anticipate both violent opposition and violent struggle
during such a transformation. 2
On the other hand, lack of equity and resettlement may lead to
violence as well. As recent events have demonstrated, lack of equity
for Palestinians forced from their homes by the state of Israel is
obviously a condition conducive to extremist politics. In addition,
resettlement into Lebanon would upset the Christian-Moslem balance
crucial to Lebanese stability and resettlement into Jordan similarly
would exacerbate the Palestinian-Jordanian split that once already has
brought civil war to that nation.
These considerations and the logic of the situation suggest that a
feasible legal framework for satisfaction of Palestinian claims should
center on the ideas of the Johnson Mission of the early 1960's. I This
Mission suggested a listing of preferences for the Palestinians, qualified
by the right of the receiving state to veto admissions for security
reasons. Nothing in this approach would preclude the process of
resettlement from leading to the creation of an Arab state of Palestine
in the West Bank area. Indeed, both Israel and Jordan might endorse
such a proposal as a solution to certain problems. For both regimes a
state of Palestine in the West Bank area might reduce the charge of
ignoring the self-determination rights of the Palestinians, thereby
reducing pressures for more violent actions. '
While this line of reasoning is not endorsed by either Israel, which
rejects repatriation and choice per se, or the Palestinians, who demand
unqualified choice and the demise of the Zionist state, the argument
does possess merit. It is close to the policy position of both the United
States and the U.S.S.R., who endorse both A/Res/194, paragraph
eleven, and the legitimacy of Israel. I This concurrence affords hope
27. For a presentation of an argument for a democratic, secular, binational
state of Palestine see Peretz, supra note 10, at 331. See also M. REISMAN,
THE

ART

OF

THE

POSSIBLE:

DIPLOMATIC

ALTERNATIVES

IN

THE

MIDDLE EAST (1970). The problems with this approach are two: there is
nothing in it for the Zionist elite and they would oppose it-with force if
necessary; should they not oppose it, the subsequent state would be dominated by
more socially aggressive Jews accustomed to democratic procedures, which will
lead to antagonisms and eventually violence within that projected state.
28. See J. JOHNSON, Arab v. Israeli: A Persistent Challenge to Americans,
18 MIDDLE EAST J. 1, 2-13 (1964); cf. D. FORSYTHE, UNITED NATIONS
PEACEMAKING

(1972).

29. Any number of subsidiary questions are involved, such as the projected
state's right to armament, its relation to Gaza, etc.
30. The United States has reportedly explored the possibility of an Arab
Palestine in the West Bank with Palestinian leaders. The Soviet Union has
Vol. 6-No. 1

VANDERBIL T JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

for a convergence of law and power. Furthermore, recent statements
by such influential states as the U.A.R. and Jordan seem compatible
with equity for the Palestinians and security for Israel. 31 Therefore,
there could be support for this form of equity from important
elements in the Arab world.
IV.

ARAB STATES AND PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE

Given the above determination of the status and claims of the
Palestinians, what is the responsibility of the Arab states toward the
Palestinians? This question, like the question of status and claims, is
not easy to subsume under legal judgment. The focus of the
controversy is the extent of Arab state responsibility for Palestinian
violence against Israel.
The factual relationship between fedayeen groups and the Arab
states, while complex, lends itself to some systemization. There is a
fundamental distinction among the Arab states: some organize and
control guerrilla groups as governmental policy; some offer support to
the guerrillas in various forms; but neither have initiated the groups
nor control them. While virtually all Arab states offer either money,
arms, logistical support, territorial bases, or verbal endorsement to the
fedayeen, only a few Arab states have sought direct governmental
control over particular groups. The United Arab Republic was the
sponsor and patron of the original Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) in the mid-1960's; Syria created Al Siquah as an adjunct of the
Ba'ath party in the late 1960's; and Iraq has sought to control the
guerrilla movement by forcibly opposing groups that do not adhere to
governmental policy. 32 The major post-1967 guerrilla organization,
PLO-A1 Fatah, is largely independent of direct governmental control
as are several active smaller groups, some within and some outside the
larger framework, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP). Relative independence has been achieved through
the popularity of "the cause" in the Arab world, through independent
reportedly informed those same leaders that the Palestinian movement should
unify behind realistic goals. On the latter point see The Christian Science Monitor,
March 9, 1971, at 2, col. 3.
31. Both the U.A.R. and Jordan have accepted an indirect recognition of
Israel's legitimacy, and have publicly stated their willingness to recognize that
legitimacy through treaty.
32. See John Cooley's reporting in The Christian Science Monitor, July 13,
1970, at 5, col. 4; Hudson, The PalestinianArab Resistance Movement, 23 MIDDLE
EAST J. 291 (1969); Sharabi, Palestine Guerrillas, SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS
(Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies) (1970); Harkabi,
Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy, ADELPHI PAPERS No. 53 (1968).
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financial wealth coming in from Palestinians particularly in Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia, and through small arms from China (via Iraq) and
Russia (via the U.A.R. and Syria).
A second factual distinction is also important. Some Arab states
support Palestinian guerrillas from a relatively voluntary commitment
to the Palestinian movement as anti-Zionist and/or anti-imperialist.
Given the regional ideology of Arab unity, no Arab state wishes to
place itself on public record as opposing the Palestinian movement,
but at least two Arab states show an unmistakable historical record of
reservations toward support of the Palestinians-Lebanon and Jordan.
The Hussein Government finally undertook direct military action
against the guerrillas in September, 1970 and thereafter. The several
Lebanese Governments, lacking both the military capability and a
mandate from the electorate to move decidedly against the fedayeen,
nevertheless have a record of some noninvolvement in anti-Zionist
affairs of the Arab world. Internally, Lebanese Governments have
challenged Palestinian activities from time to time; and while the
governments are as fragmented as the larger Lebanese society, the
general outcome of governmental policy has been distinctly different
from Iraqi, Syrian, and U.A.R. policy on the question of Palestinian
support.
Hence, the factual situation is characterized by general, but
uneven, Arab state support of Palestinian violence against Israel.
Neither PLO-Al Fatah activities nor those of other groups are
controlled by these states. The factual situation demonstrates a
dichotomy between Palestinian interests and a given state's interests
(most notably evident in the Jordanian civil war).
State claims concerning responsibility in this factual context vary
considerably. A particular problem for the process of claim evaluation
in the Arab-Israeli conflict is distinguishing public pronouncements
intended for certain domestic or foreign communities from legal
claims intended to coincide with actual public policy. " Since there is
no sure legal standard for this task, one must take careful note of state
practice over time.
33. While this problem exists in evaluations of most governmental claims, it
is accentuated in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Observers have long noted the Arab
tendency to make extreme and provocative public statements frequently at
variance with actual policy; although Israel, too, has misrepresented claims, as
when it argued in the Security Council that the U.A.R. carried out an armed
attack in 1967 before Israel's air strike on the U.A.R. air force. See, e.g., T. LIE,
IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE 97 (1954). See generally Deutsch, The Probabilityof
International Law, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 8, at 57.
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Unfortunately, the norms of the United Nations Charter prohibiting threat or use of force, while being law of the first order, do
not necessarily apply to guerrilla groups. Consequently, the Charter
framework does not provide a sure guide for assessment of claims, at
least in prima facie form. In such situations, "it appears useful to
maintain second-order levels of legal inquiry...

."

That is to say,

one must look to a second order of legal norms-the customary laws
of state responsibility. These become relevant when Charter norms are
too general or are bypassed for other reasons. The traditional norms of
this second order, however, are not self-sufficient in their historical
form since "the legal rules and standards embodied in international
law do not come to grips with the underlying policy setting provided
by the Arab-Israeli conflict." 35 Particularly for guerrilla violence,
34. Falk, The Beirut Raid and the InternationalLaw of Retaliation, 63 AM.
J. INT'L L. 415, 430-31 (1969). One can distinguish several different "orders"
of legal considerations. Recognition of differing levels or orders of law merely
reflects the complexity of the international system. Geographical and ideological
diversity, the various processes of rule formation and application, the heterogeneity of situations to be regulated all suggest the utility of such a distinction.
See McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of
Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959). Claims based upon the Charter would
be claims of the first order. These general principles, however, are at such a level

of abstraction that normative guidance from them in concrete situations is
impossible. Such guidance must come from the network of consensual rules that
arise out of the everyday interaction of states-second order considerations.
Often, these too are vague, and so there is the possibility of even a third order of
considerations.
However persuasive this argument is in analytic terms, there is a problem with
it in practical terms. Its relatively unconventional nature means that it is either
unknown or irrelevant to policy-makers. It is arguable that the functions of law
operate whether policy-makers are aware of them or not, but the fact remains that
officials will still regard clear statements of general principles as substantive rules
of law whenever it suits them. Even if the above argument is a good one and
explains a good deal, its credibility with practitioners is a limited one. As a result,
the present confusion over the law of civil war and other uses of coercion short of
general war is perpetuated. For an elaboration of this argument with respect to
reprisals see Onuf, The Current Status of Reprisals, AM.SocY INT'L L. (1970)
(mimeo).
35. Falk, supra note 34, at 437. Both the Arab states and Israel justify their
actions by a claim of action in self-defense. Since under the Charter this is the
only allowable exercise of force, it is to be expected that all parties to a conflict
will invoke such a claim. Given the paralysis of the U.N. peacekeeping machinery,
in addition to the controversy over the scope of the right under article 51 and
article 2.4, the Charter provides little guidance for the evaluation of claims. See J.
STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 92-103 (1958); J. BRIERLY,
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there must be a contextual analysis of politico-factual situations and
subsequent modification of traditional norms in the interest of
relevancy and concomitant probability of obedience. 36
The traditional Arab public posture had been to claim that
aggression originated when the Zionists seized control of Palestine in
1947-1948; in the words of Foreign Minister Bourguiba of Tunisia, "it is
the very existence of Israel which constitutes permanent aggression." 37 The Arab argument then continues with the claim that war
and lesser violence is permitted as a sanction against the continuing
aggression. This is the essential position of states such as Syria, and it
is the position of spokesmen such as Baroody of Saudia Arabia,
whatever the official policy of his government. 38 It is also the stand
taken by the Palestinian fedayeen when their revolutionary ideology is
translated into legal terms.
While this position may have had legitimacy in the late 1940's, it
cannot be accepted in the 1970's. Israel has gained legitimacy. 11
Furthermore, a claim to an unlimited right to threaten a state's

THE LAW OF NATIONS 416-20 (C. Waldock ed. 1963); D. BOWETT, SELF
DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958); I. BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at
268; R. HIGGINS, supra note 20, at 167.
In the absence of authoritative guidance from the Charter, a case can be made
that customary law is still effective. This is of little help, however, since the scope
of customary rights is equally vague and uncertain. In the absence of authoritative
third-party review, customary rights are affirmed to cover not only threats to a
state's territorial integrity but also its vital interests or "existence" in a broader
sense. Similarly, there are no clear guidelines to evaluate the proportionality of
force used in self-defense. There is considerable disagreement on whether
proportionality applies to objectives pursued or to the size and character of the
aggression, i.e. whether a state may act to remove the cause of aggression, or
simply to repel the aggression. The response and consequent justification of the
United States in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 demonstrates the difficulty of
the problem. See Gerberding, InternationalLaw and the Cuban Missile Crisis, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL CRISIS 175-210 (L. Scheinman & D.
Wilkinson eds. 1968).
36. For an elaboration of this idea and a critique of Falk see Taulbee,
Retaliation and Guerrilla Warfare in Contemporary International Law, 8 INT'L
LAWYER (January 1973).
37. A. LALL, THE U.N. AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, 1967 at 181
(1968).
38. For a very illustrative summary of the debate in the Security Council
after the Israeli raid in the spring of 1969 see 6 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE,
No. 4 at 14-36 (1969). The focus on this raid caused most governments to clarify
their positions on the legal point at issue for the first time since 1967.
39. See Sharabi, supra note 32, at apps.
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existence, when not supported by state practice or community
expectations, tends to undermine all restraining norms. Law is largely
irrelevant in such a revolutionary political setting. 40 There must be
agreement on avoiding threats to existence if mutually advantageous
laws are to become operative. 4 1 Palestinians realistically cannot
expect implementation of the emerging law on refugee choice or of
the general law on proportionality in reprisal on which such unlimited
claims are made. In addition, state practice increasingly rejects the
assertion that Israel is a colonial state and thus a legitimate target of
violence under the higher law of anticolonialism. Not only do the
Western and Latin American states reject that assertion, but Jordan
and the U.A.R. have recognized, inter alia, the basic legitimacy of
Israel. 42 Moreover, the Soviet spokesman in the Security Council is on
record as stating that "nobody denie[s] the right of Israel to
exist... ."' Claims to exercise violence against the very existence of
Israel cannot be accepted now by any legal order seeking minimum
public order, whether the perspective of the claimant be traditional
interpretation of specific law, philosophical interpretation of specific
law, philosophical interpretation of "natural rights," state practice, or
community expectations. 44

40. See Hoffmann, International Systems and InternationalLaw, in THE
& S. Verba eds. 1961).
41. See generally Deutsch, supra note 33.
42. This is evidenced by the following: acceptance of Resolution 242, which
recognizes the right of all states in the Middle East to security; public statements
offering an end to the state of belligerency; and the U.A.R. offer to sign a treaty
with Israel.
43. 6 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, No. 4, at 28-29 (1969). Soviet policies
and legal claims on this series of issues have been something less than fully
consistent. In general, the Soviets endorse the "sacred right of all peoples that are
determinedly fighting for the liquidation of racist and colonial regimes and are
fighting against imperialist aggression." Bowett, Reprisals, Am.Soc'Y INT'L L.
(1970) (mimeo). Yet the Soviets have also argued that "Li]ll-considered and rash
actions which do no substantial harm to Israel's military potential cannot solve
the problem of eliminating the consequences of the Israeli aggression, and... may
even help the Israeli extremists.... ." Dmitriev, The Arab World and Israel's
Aggression, INT'L AFFAIRS (Moscow) 23 (1970). These pronouncements, coupled
with Soviet arguments in the Security Council, seem to support resistance to
illegal occupation but not violence against Israel per se.
44. For a relevant argument that pursuit of minimum order is more likely to
lead to justice than the pursuit of absolute justice at the expense of order see C.
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (K. Knorr

DEVISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

(3d ed. P.

Corbett transl. 1967).
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The traditional Arab claim, and with it the right to give total
support to the fedayeen, has been significantly altered by some states
since 1967. Jordan, the U.A.R., the U.S.S.R. and others now focus on
the territory occupied since 1967 by Israel, claiming a right to support
Palestinian violence or direct governmental violence against Israel's
presence in these areas. 41 While the Palestinians themselves recognize
no such difference in Israeli controlled territory, these other states lay
claim to the permissibility of violence for two reasons: (1) because
this territory is said to be clearly colonialist in nature, the higher law
of violent struggle against colonialism is controlling; (2) occupation
during time of war is legal, but when an end to the state of war is
offered there is a right to resist if the occupier will not withdraw.
The competing Israeli claim is that, with the collapse of the 1949
Armistice Agreements in both 1956 and 1967, states have become
bound by the specific prohibition against coercion contained in the
Security Council's cease-fire resolution of 1967. 1 Behind this legal
stance is the Israeli concern that reference to post-1967 occupied land
is but a prelude to characterizing all of Israel as illegally occupied,
which is of course the position of the Palestinians and of some
supporting states such as Syria.
The starting point for evaluation is that if states such as Jordan
and the U.A.R. make an argument supporting limited violence, they
must exercise their responsibility in curtailing guerrilla activity from
their territory directed against the existence of Israel per se. Both law
and logic are clear on this point. '" There is no doubt that the
Egyptian Government has the capability to exercise this responsibility.
Events during the fall of 1970 indicate that Jordan also has the
capability to police its own territory, although the cost in September
of 1970 was high in terms of over-all stability; the territory is well
under the Government's control. Lebanon, unique as usual, is not
altogether free of the same responsibility. 48 Syria, the fourth staging
45. See 6 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, No. 4, at 28-29 (1969).
46. See the Israeli statement of November 18, 1966, in Bowett, supra n. 43.
47. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 323.
48. Lebanon is one Arab state that historically has maintained a de facto

posture of neutrality.-Its forces were involved in neither the 1956 nor the 1967
actions. To the extent that the Government has control over the situation,
neutrality has been maintained since 1967. It appears that the Arab world
generally recognizes the imperatives of the Lebanese situation; consequently, with
the exception of Syria, there is no demand from other Arab states that Lebanon
overtly support the guerrillas. This understanding is a prudent calculation based
on Lebanese domestic politics. The Moslem-Christian split is such that any overt
action either in support of or in opposition to the Palestinian guerrillas will
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area for Palestinian raids, has increased its control over the fedayeen
since the military ousted the more adventuresome politicians in the
early fall of 1970. While Syria has not yet either accepted S/242 or
renounced a policy of total fedayeen support, it too falls logically
under these same constraints.
It would seem, therefore, there is no state obligation to prohibit
the operations of groups that direct their attacks to military targets in
the areas occupied since 1967. This may be interpreted as a legitimate
challenge to Israeli occupation, since it is clear that no title accrues
through occupation. 4 9 The responsibility for the origin of the 1967
war is not significant as a point of law, especially if it is held, as is
reasonable considering the facts, that both Israel and the U.A.R. were
aggressive. 5 0 Violence in resistance to occupation, however, must
clearly demonstrate a difference from attacks against Israel per se. The
most obvious differentiation is the limitation of targets to the
occupied territories and to military targets. It would reduce unnecessary destruction if this norm were matched by the avoidance of
population centers, whether refugee or national, by the fedayeen in
the anticipation of Israeli reprisal. Rather than being naive and
legalistic restraints, these points largely have been agreed on in the
past between the fedayeen and Arab governments in a compromise
between guerrilla interests in raids and government interests in
avoiding reprisal. In the period 1968-1970 such agreements were
negotiated by both Lebanon and Jordan. In the Lebanese case, there
remains a loosely defined free-fire zone in southern Lebanon where

jeopardize the stability of the Government. While it is true that the guerrillas use
Lebanese territory as a base for their operations, the Lebanese Government can do
little to control them. Given the position of Lebanon in the history of the
conflict, the Israeli raid against the Beirut airport seems unreasonable. See Falk,
supra note 34, at 442-43.
49. See R. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
WARFARE 17-18

52 (1963); M.
(1960).

GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND

50. It is perhaps generally assumed in the West that only the U.A.R. was
aggressive in ordering the withdrawal of U.N.E.F., mobilizing troops and
deploying them in Sinai, ordering a blockade on the Gulf of Aqaba, and making
bellicose statements. Israel, however, had exercised certain threats against Syria
and, most importantly, was the first to initiate armed attack at a time when the
U.A.R. was beginning to negotiate with the United States on how to avoid war.
Thus Israel initiated violence when the threat of imminent attack probably was
declining. See The Christian Science Monitor, October 3,1 970, at 1; M. COPELAND,
THE GAME OF NATIONS 276-77 (1969). For a larger perspective see W.
LAQUEUR, THE ROAD TO WAR (1969).
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the guerrillas operate with the understanding that they stay out of the
cities. If the legal order cannot establish an effective law for behavior,
then it can lend its support to the best available law of behavior. "
It may seem somewhat artificial to urge that violence be contained
within territory occupied since 1967 in order to demonstrate that the
activity is directed toward impermissible occupation rather than
Israel's security per se. But it is not. While it is true that bomb damage
in Tel Aviv is as destructive as in Ramalah, the former does not
achieve the stated objective of resisting occupation. It has the reverse
effect of increasing Israeli determination to stay in the occupied
territories for security reasons. Military effectiveness has long been an
underlying support for the laws regulating coercion; 2 accordingly, it
is in the military as well as in the legal interest of those legitimately
resisting illegal occupation to contain violence within the occupied
territories.
Some question, however, arises concerning rights acquired by
conquest in the occupied territories because of certain Israeli actions
in East Jerusalem and the West Bank that clearly are in violation of its
obligations and rights as occupant power. Since there is no clear rule
of law5 3 regarding the acquisition of territory by conquest, the
discussion might more usefully focus on the economic and political
factors that must be considered in any eventual legal judgment.
The occupied territories can be divided into two categories-those
to which the Palestinians have some claim, and those that formed part
of the de facto or de jure territory of the adjacent Arab states. East
Jerusalem, Gaza and the West Bank area fall into both categories.
Thus there is a potential divergence in interest between the Arab states
and the Palestinians concerning the eventual disposition of certain of
the occupied territories. In addition, it might be fruitful to distinguish
between those territories in which Israeli interest is primarily strategic
and those in which its interest is potentially economic or ideological.

51. See generally Deutsch, supra note 33.
52. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD

PUBLIC ORDER 520 (1961).
53. This point has engendered considerable debate. In the traditional
pre-United Nations view, acquisition of territory by conquest and subsequent
annexation was recognized, although at times with great reluctance, as the logical
consequence of the legal status of war. For a good survey of the literature see M.
MCMAHON, CONQUEST AND MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1940).
Under the Charter, nations are not to reap the benefits of a resort to force, and so
it would seem that territory gained by conquest cannot be legitimately kept. The
Council, Assembly, major states and numerous states have recently endorsed that
concept.
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The prima facie case for return of East Jerusalem to Jordan is a
weak one. 11 The original partition plan provided for the establishment of Jerusalem as separate from the proposed Jewish and Arab
states, but integrated into a projected economic union. While the
Arabs resisted the plan, the Israelis accepted it as the price of
partition. Several plans for internationalization of the city were drawn
up but never implemented.5 5 Despite a number of General Assembly
resolutions for internationalization, both Israel and Jordan formally
incorporated the areas controlled at the Armistice in 1948. Hence,
neither side had strict legal title to the portion it controlled before the
war in June of 1967. To the extent that military decisions are subject
to change by subsequent military actions, the Israeli action in
incorporating the whole city is not barred by the Armistice. Israel has
done no more than Jordan did in 1949. Israel, of course, is obligated
to protect the rights of the Arab population and others who hold the
city sacred.
This does not argue that the case for internationalization is
irrelevant. Internationalization under a plan more or less similar to the
original proposal would clearly accomplish Israel's stated goals of
unifying the city and ending an artificial division. 56 Nonetheless, it is
probable that this solution will not be acceptable to either side. The
Armistice line, however, does not have to be regarded as the
presumptive starting point for negotiations on the status of Jerusalem.
In Sinai the problem is different. The territory involved is
Egyptian and no other state or faction has a claim to it. The same is
true of the Golan Heights of Syria. From the standpoint of a status
iniuriae to an Israeli security interest, the occupation of these
territories is legal until a treaty of peace is signed. 11 Nevertheless, the
legality of occupation is affected by the over-all context of occupation. " It would seem that a satisfactory guarantee of Israeli security,
such as the permanent demilitarization of Golan and the Sharm el
Sheik, is not only the prerequisite for any settlement, but would also
remove any justification for continued occupation. Given the contemporary tendency for armistices to serve the function of peace

54. Schwebel, What Weight to Conquest? 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 354-57 (1970).
See generally R. JENNINGS, supra note 49.
55. See also E. WILSON, JERUSALEM: KEY TO PEACE (1969); R.
PFAFF, JERUSALEM:

KEYSTONE

OF AN

ARAB-ISRAELI

SETTLEMENT

(1969).
56. The N. Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1967, at 23.
57. See M. GREENSPAN, supra note 49, at 213.
58. See R. JENNINGS, supra note 49, at 52.
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treaties, 5 9 and given the recent proposals of the U.A.R. to the Jarring
Mission, 6 0 continued Israeli occupation seems increasingly unreasonable.
Gaza and the West Bank may be grouped together since both were
to be part of the originally projected Arab-Palestinian state. When the
projected state did not emerge, the Egyptians took Gaza and the
Jordanians annexed the West Bank. Again, if the Armistice lines are
purely military and not political, these territories are not part of the
respective states. As with Jerusalem, although Israel does not have a
greater right to these territories, it does not have a lesser right either.
The principal distinction to be made here, and one that strongly
endorses the Jordanian claim (but not the Egyptian), is the importance of the West Bank to the Jordanian economy. There is some
question about Jordan's ability to survive as a viable state without the
West Bank. 61 This is not the case with Gaza, which is in no way vital
to the Egyptian economy and is separated from the central part of
Egypt by the Sinai desert. This point has relevance for the whole
problem: when the claims on both sides are equally unclear and when
both sides demonstrate little concern for law, the solutions necessarily
must be on the basis of other than narrow legal considerations.
V. CONCLUSIONS

We have been focusing on the type of law that seeks to regulate
coercion rather than on other types of law such as those that establish
a framework of jurisdiction or that lay a foundation for community
building. 62 We have found that within this law of regulation there
may be several orders or levels of legal inquiry. The first, that of the
United Nations Charter, has proved generally uninstructive in efforts
to evaluate claims on the basis of order and equity in the complex
factual situation of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1970's. 6 3 The
second order of restraining norms, that of the customary law of war,
of measures short of war, and of neutrality, has also proved somewhat
deficient in clearly illuminating controlling legal principles. This is the

59. See M. GREENSPAN, supra note 49, at 589.
60. The U.A.R. has offered both plans for a DMZ at Sharm el Sheik and a
peace treaty with Israel. Apparently, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have discussed
guarantees for Israeli security.
61. Several points in this overview could be satisfied, however, if an Arab
state of Palestine, linked economically to Jordan, were created in the East Bank.

62. See Hoffman, supra note 40; W.

COPLIN,

THE FUNCTIONS

OF

(1966).
63. Major problems are the definition of force, aggression and self-defense.
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case regarding Palestinian claims to refugee choice and Israeli claims to
reprisals against targets in Jordan. Thus we have ultimately resorted to
a third level of legal inquiry, that of the relevance of these customary
norms when modified by a contextual analysis of the contemporary
features of the Arab-Israeli conflict-such as the validity of claims to
the "higher law" of national liberation and anti-imperialism, and
claims to reprisal based on an assertion of state responsibility for
guerrilla activity. It is our view that the normal scope for creativity in
legal reasoning, found in all legal systems, 6 4 must be expanded under
the international legal order. Revolutionary changes in state perspectives, modes of coercive interaction and community value judgments
make this imperative. 6
The function of this law, while maximally to restrain behavior in
keeping with community expectations, is multifaceted. The persistent
weakness of centrally organized and managed sanctions obviously
undermines the effectiveness of law as a restraint system. But law as a
tool of communication and framework for analysis, which is perhaps
the major role for law regarding coercive processes in a fragmented
political system, is not so weakened. States can at times bypass
third-party legal inquiry when the power configuration permits. It is
increasingly clear, however, that they do so at some sacrifice and cost
to their real long-term interests. 6 6 Reasonable interpretations of
international law have been trying to communicate to Arab actors for
some time the interests derived from acceptance of the legitimacy of
Israel. These same interpretations are now trying to communicate to
Israel the futility of its quest for regional stability when law and
equity are ignored-whether concerning territory or legitimate claims
of the Palestinians. If actors fail to pursue their real national interests,
it is in part because they fail to observe what law is trying to convey.
The question of sanctions remains "separable from the question of
whether the core law itself is present." 67
The Arab-Israeli conflict has generated certain normative sets that
we hold relevant for a broader range of situations: The impermissibility of imperialism, but the need to restrict that term to
64. See B.

CARDOZo,

THE NATURE

OF

THE JUDICIAL

PROCESS

98-141 (1921).
65. We speak here of the addition of non-Western and noncapitalist states,
the proclivity to guerrilla activity, and the growing importance of collective review
of state assertions. See generally Falk, Gaps and Biases in Contemporary Theories
of International Law, in R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 7-40 (1970).
66. See L. HENKIN, supra note 5,at 270-71.
67. M. BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS

155 (1968).
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situations clearly so defined by state practice and community
judgments; the impermissibility of title by conquest, but the need to
direct resistance to illegal occupation rather than legitimate state
security per se; the impermissibility of state surrender of authority in
relation to guerrillas, but the need to recognize situations in which a
government does not have the capability to control guerrilla activity.
As with other types and orders of international law, the implementation of these sets and their derivative specifics depend upon a system
of mutual reciprocity that, in turn, reflects the shared interests of the
actors in a conflict situation.
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